For simplicity, most of the literature introduces the concept of definitional equivalence only to languages with disjoint signatures. In a recent paper, Barrett and Halvorson introduce a straightforward generalization to languages with non-disjoint signatures and they show that their generalization is not equivalent to intertranslatability in general. In this paper, we show that their generalization is not transitive and hence it is not an equivalence relation. Then we introduce the Andréka and Németi generalization as one of the many equivalent formulations for languages with disjoint signatures. We show that the Andréka-Németi generalization is the smallest equivalence relation containing the Barrett-Halvorson generalization and it is equivalent to intertranslatability even for languages with non-disjoint signatures. Finally, we investigate which definitions for definitional equivalences remain equivalent when we generalize them for theories with nondisjoint signatures.
Introduction
Definitional equivalence 1 has been studied and used by both mathematicians and philosophers of science as a possible criterion to establish the equivalence between different theories. This concept was first introduced by Montague in (Montague 1956 ), but there are already some traces of the idea in (Tarski et al. 1953 ). In philosophy of science, it was introduced by Glymour in (Glymour 1970) , (Glymour 1977) and (Glymour 1980) . Corcoran discusses in (Corcoran 1980 ) the history of definitional equivalence. In (Andréka et al. 2002, Section 6.3) and (Madarász 2002, Section 4.3) , definitional equivalence is generalized to many-sorted definability, where even new entities can be defined and not just new relations between existing entities. (Barrett and Halvorson 2016a) , on which the present paper is partly a commentary, and (Barrett and Halvorson 2016b) contain more references to examples on the use of definitional equivalence in the context of philosophy of science.
We have also recently started in (Lefever and Székely 2018) to use definitional equivalence to study the exact differences and similarities between theories which are not equivalent, in that case classical and relativistic kinematics. In that paper, we showed that there exists a translation of relativistic kinematics into classical kinematics, but not the other way round. We also showed that special relativity extended with a "primitive ether" is definitionally equivalent to classical kinematics. Those theories are expressed in the same language, and hence have non-disjoint signatures 2 .
Barrett and Halvorson generalize in (Barrett and Halvorson 2016a , Definition 2) definitional equivalence from (Hodges 1993, pp. 60-61) for languages having non-disjoint vocabularies in a straightforward way. Then they show that their generalization, which we call here definitional mergeability to avoid ambiguity, is not equivalent to intertranslatability in general but only for theories with disjoint signatures. In this paper, we show that definitional mergeability is not an equivalence relation because it is not transitive. Then we recall Andréka and Németi's Definition 4.2 from (Andréka and Németi 2014) which is known to be equivalent to definitional mergeability for languages with disjoint signatures. Then we show that the Andréka-Németi definitional equivalence is the smallest equivalence relation containing definitional mergeablitiy and that it is equivalent to intertranslatability even for theories with languages with nondisjoint signatures. Actually, two theories are definitional equivalent iff there is a theory that is definitionally mergeable to both of them. Moreover, one of these definitional mergers can be a renaming.
Theorem 4.2 of (Andréka and Németi 2014) claims that (i) definitional equivalence, (ii) definitional mergeability, (iii) intertranslatability and (iv) model mergeability (see Definition 13 below) are equivalent in case of disjoint signatures. Here, we show that the equivalence of (i) and (iii) and that of (ii) and (iv) hold for arbitrary languages, see Theorems 8 and 7. However, since (i) and (ii) are not equivalent by Theorems 1 and 3, no other equivalence of extends to arbi-trary languages. Finally, we introduce a modification of (iv) that is equivalent to (i) and (iii) for arbitrary languages, see Theorem 9.
Framework and definitions
Definition 1. A signature 3 Σ is a set of predicate symbols (relation symbols), function symbols, and constant symbols.
Definition 2.
A first-order language L is a set containing a signature, as well as the terms and formulas which can be constructed from that signature using first-order logic.
Remark 1. For every theory T which might contain constants and functions, there is another theory T ′ which is formulated in a language containing only relation symbols and connected to T by all the relations investigated in this paper as candidates for definitional equivalence, see (Barrett and Halvorson 2016a , Proposition 2 and Theorem 1). Therefore, here we only consider languages containing only relation symbols.
Definition 3.
A sentence is a formula without free variables.
Definition 4.
A theory T is a set of sentences expressed in language L.
Convention 1.
We will use the notations Σ x , Σ ′ , etc. for the signatures, and L x , L ′ , etc. for the languages of respective theories T x , T ′ , etc.
Definition 5. A model M = M, R M : R ∈ Σ of signature Σ consists of a non-empty underlying set 4 M , and for all relation symbols R of Σ, a relation R M ∈ M n with the corresponding arity 5 .
Definition 6. Let M be a model, let M be the non-empty underlying set of M, let ϕ be a formula, let V be the set of variables and let e : V → M be an evaluation of variables, then we inductively define that e satisfies ϕ in M, in symbols
as:
e(x), e(y), . . . , e(z) ∈ R M , 3 In (Andréka and Németi 2014), a signature is called a vocabulary. Since this paper is partly a comment on (Barrett and Halvorson 2016a) , we will use their terminology, which is also being used in (Hodges 1993) and (Hodges 1997) . 4 The non-empty underlying set M is also called the universe, the carrier or the domain of M. 5 The arity n is the number of variables in the relation, it is also called the rank, degree, adicity or valency of the relation. M n denotes the Cartesian power of set M . 
Remark 2. We will use ϕ ∨ ψ as an abbreviation for
Definition 7. M od(T ) is the class of models of theory T ,
Definition 8. Two theories T 1 and T 2 are logically equivalent, in symbols
iff 7 they have the same class of models, i.e., M od(
Definition 9. Let L ⊂ L + be two languages. An explicit definition of an n-ary
where ϕ is a formula of L.
where ∆ is a set of explicit definitions in terms of language L for each relation symbol p ∈ L + \ L. In this paper, by ⇐⇒ in the meta-language. 8 We follow the definition from (Andréka and Németi 2014, Section 4.1, p.36) , (Hodges 1993, p.60) and (Hodges 1997, p.53) . In (Barrett and Halvorson 2016a, Section 3.1), the logical equivalence relation is not part of the definition.
We will use ∆ xy to denote the set of explicit definitions when the signature Σ y of theory T y is defined in terms of the signature Σ x of theory T x .
Definition 11. Two theories T , T ′ are definitionally equivalent, in symbols
if there is a chain T 1 , . . . , T n of theories such that T = T 1 , T ′ = T n , and for all
Remark 3. If a theory is consistent, then all theories which are definitionally equivalent to that theory are also consistent since definitions cannot make consistent theories inconsistent. Similarly, if a theory is inconsistent, then all theories which are definitionally equivalent to that theory are also inconsistent.
Definition 12. Let T 1 and T 2 be theories of languages L 1 and L 2 , respectively. T 1 and T 2 are definitionally mergeable, in symbols
if there is a theory T + which is a common definitional extension of T 1 and T 2 ,
i.e.,
Remark 4. From Definition 11 and Definition 12, it is immediately clear that being definitionally mergeable is a special case of being definitionally equivalent.
Lemma 1 below establishes that our Definition 12 of definitional mergeability is equivalent to the definition for definitional equivalence in (Barrett and Halvorson 2016a, Definition 2). Lemma 1. Let T 1 and T 2 be two arbitrary theories. Then T 1 → ← T 2 iff there are sets of explicit definitions ∆ 12 and ∆ 21 such that
By the definition of definitional extension, there exist sets of explicit definitions ∆ 12 and ∆ 21 such that T 1 ∪ ∆ 12 ≡ T + and T 2 ∪ ∆ 21 ≡ T + , and hence by transitivity
To prove the other direction: let T 1 and T 2 be theories such that T 1 ∪ ∆ 12 ≡ T 2 ∪ ∆ 21 for some sets ∆ 12 and ∆ 21 of explicit definitions. Let
and therefore
Convention 2. If theories T 1 and T 2 are definitionally mergeable and their signatures are disjoint, i.e., Σ 1 ∩ Σ 2 = ∅, we write
Definition 13. Theories T 1 and T 2 are model mergeable 9 , in symbols
iff there is a bijection β between M od(T 1 ) and M od(T 2 ) that is defined along two sets ∆ 12 and ∆ 21 of explicit definitions such that if M ∈ M od(T 1 ), then
• the underlying sets of M and β(M) are the same,
• the relations in β(M) are the ones defined in M according to ∆ 12 and vice versa, the relations in M are the ones defined in β(M) according to ∆ 21 .
Definition 14. Let T 1 and T 2 be theories. A translation 10 tr of theory T 1 to theory
• maps every n-ary relation symbol p ∈ L 1 to a corresponding formula ϕ p ∈ L 2 of n with free variables, i.e., tr p(
• preserves the equality, logical connectives, and quantifiers, i.e.,
, and -tr(∃xϕ) is ∃x tr(ϕ) .
• maps consequences of T 1 into consequences of T 2 , i.e., T 1 |= ϕ implies T 2 |= tr(ϕ) for all sentence ϕ ∈ L 1 .
Remark 5. From (Andréka et al. 2005 ), we know that T being translatable into
Definition 15. Theories T 1 and T 2 are intertranslatable 11 , in symbols
if there are translations tr 12 of T 1 to T 2 and tr 21 of T 2 to T 1 such that
We use the definition from (Andréka and Németi 2014, p. 40, item iv) , which is a variant of the definition in (Henkin et al. 1971, p. 56, Remark 0.1.6) . 10 In (Andréka and Németi 2014) , (Lefever 2017) and (Lefever and Székely 2018) , this is called an interpretation, but we again follow the terminology from (Barrett and Halvorson 2016a) here. 11 In (Henkin et al. 1985, p. 167, Definition 4.3.42) , definitional equivalence is defined as intertranslatability.
for every formulas ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) and formula ψ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) of languages L 1 and L 2 , respectively.
For a direct proof that intertranslatability is an equivalence relation, see e.g., (Lefever 2017, Theorem 1, p. 7) . This fact also follows from Theorems 3 and 8 below.
Definition 16. The relation defined by formula ϕ in M is 12 :
Definition 17. For all translations tr 12 : L 1 → L 2 of theory T 1 to theory T 2 , let tr * 12 be defined as the map that maps model
that is all predicates p i of Σ 1 interpreted in model tr * 12 (M) as the relation defined by formula tr 12 (p i ).
Lemma 2. Let M be a model of language L 2 , let ϕ be a formula of language L 1 , and let e : V → M be an evaluation of variables. If
Proof. We are going to prove Lemma 2 by induction on the complexity of ϕ. So let us first assume that ϕ is a single predicate p of language L 1 .
Letū be the e-image of the free variables of p. 
By Definition 16, tr 12 (p)
If ϕ is x = y, then we should show that
Since translations preserve mathematical equality by Definition 14, this is equivalent to tr *
, which holds because the underlying sets of tr * 12 (M) and M are the same and both sides of the equivalence are equivalent to e(x) = e(y) by Definition 6.
Let us now prove the more complex cases by induction on the complexity of formulas.
• If ϕ is ¬ψ, then we should show that
Since tr 12 is a translation, it preserves (by Definition 14) the conectives, and therefore this is equivalent to
which holds by Definition 6 Item 3 since we have
by induction.
• If ϕ is (ψ ∧ θ), then we should show that
Since tr 12 is a translation, it preserves (by Definition 14) the conectives, and therefore tr 12 (ψ ∧ θ) is equivalent to tr 12 (ψ) ∧ tr 12 (θ), and hence the above is equivalent to hold by induction.
• If ϕ is ∃y(ψ), then we should show that
holds. Since tr 12 is a translation, it preserves (by Definition 14) the quantifiers, and hence this is equivalent to
By Definition 6 Item 5, both sides of he equivalence hold exactly if there exists an element b ∈ M such that
where e ′ (y) = b and e ′ (x) = e(x) if x = y, which holds by induction because the underlying sets of tr * 12 (M) and M are the same.
that is, tr * 12 is a map from M od(T 2 ) to M od(T 1 ).
Proof. Let M be a model of T 2 and let ϕ ∈ T 1 . We should prove that tr * 12 (M) |= ϕ. By Lemma 2, we have that
Hence tr 12 (ϕ) is true in every model of T 2 as we wanted to prove.
Remark 6. Note that while tr 12 is a translation of T 1 to T 2 , tr * 12 translates models the other way round from M od(T 2 ) to M od(T 1 ). For an example illustrating this for a translation from relativistic kinematics to classical kinematics, see (Lefever 2017 
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Remark 7. Note that disjoint renaming is symmetric but neither reflexive nor
3 Properties Theorem 1. Definitional mergeability → ← is not transitive. Hence it is not an equivalence relation.
The proof is based on (Barrett and Halvorson 2016a, Example 5) . Note that the proof relies on the signatures of theories T 1 and T 2 being non-disjoint. 13 While bijection R ∅ ΣΣ ′ is defined on signatures, it can be naturally extended to the languages using those signatures. We will use the same symbol R ∅ ΣΣ ′ for that.
Proof. Let p and q be unary predicate symbols. Consider the following theories T 1 , T 2 and T 3 :
T 1 and T 2 are not definitionally mergeable, since they do not have a common extension as they contradict each other 14 .
Let us define T + 1 where q is defined in terms of T 1 as p and let us define T + 3
where p is defined in terms of T 3 as q, i.e.,
Then T 1 and T 3 are definitionally mergeable because
Let us now define T + 2 where q is defined in terms of T 2 as ¬p and let us define T × 3 where p is defined in terms of T 3 as ¬q, i.e.,
Then T 2 and T 3 are definitionally mergeable because
Therefore, being definitionally mergeable is not transitive and hence not an equivalence relation as T 1 → ← T 3 → ← T 2 but T 1 and T 2 are not definitionally mergeable.
Theorem 2. If theories T 1 , T 2 and T 3 are formulated in languages having disjoint signatures and T 1 → ← T 2 and T 2 → ← T 3 , then T 1 and T 3 are also mergeable,
Proof. Let T 1 , T 2 and T 3 be theories such that
We have from the definitions of definitional equivalence and definitional extension that there exist sets ∆ 12 , ∆ 21 , ∆ 23 and ∆ 32 of explicit definitions, such that
and
We want to prove that
If one of the theories T 1 , T 2 or T 3 is inconsistent, then by Remark 3, all of them are inconsistent. In that case T 1 → ← T 3 is true because all statements can be proven ex falso in both theories. Let us for the rest of the proof now assume that all of them are consistent. (2) and also M |= T 3 ∪ ∆ 32 because of (3) and the fact that M |= ∆ 23 . Hence
).
An analogous calculation shows that
and this is what we wanted to prove. Proof. To show that definitional equivalence is an equivalence relation, we need to show that it is reflexive, symmetric and transitive:
• ∆ ≡ is reflexive because for every theory T → T since the set of explicit definitions ∆ can be the empty set, and hence T ∆ ≡ T . 
Proof. The finite chain of steps given by Definition 11 for definitional equivalence can be extended by adding extra extension steps → or ← wherever needed in the chain because definitional extension is reflexive since the set of explicit definitions ∆ can be the empty set.
Lemma 4. Let T a and T b two theories for which T a → ← T b . Then
Proof. Since T a → ← T b , there are by Lemma 1 sets ∆ ab and ∆ ba of explicite defi-
i.e., ϕ q is the definition of predicate q from Σ a in language L b . We can now define ∆ ab ′ and ∆ b ′ a in the following way:
p of predicate p from Σ b is defined with the same formula ϕ p as p was defined in ∆ ab .
of the formula ϕ p that was used in ∆ ab to define p.
ϕ q ) of the formula ϕ q that was used in ∆ ba to define q. Theorem 4. Theories T 1 and T 2 are definitionally equivalent iff there is a theory T ′ 2 which is the disjoint renaming of T 2 to a signature which is also disjoint from the signature of T 1 such that T ′ 2 and T 1 are definitionally mergeable, i.e.,
Proof. Let T 1 and T 2 be definitional equivalent theories. From Lemma 3, we know that there exists a finite chain of definitonal mergers
For all x in {a, . . . , z, 2}, let T ′ x be a renaming of
where all theories in the chain have signatures which are disjoint from the signatures of all the other theories in the chain, except for T 1 and T 2 which may have signatures which are non-disjoint.
By Theorem 2, the consecutive mergers from T 1 to T To show the converse direction, let us assume that T 1 and T 2 are such theories that there is a disjoint renaming theory T 
Corollary 2. Two theories are definitionally equivalent iff they can be connected by two definitional mergers:
Consequently, the chain T 1 , . . . , T n in Definition 11 can allways be choosed to be at most length four.
Proof. This follows immediately from Theorem 4 and Remark 7. It is known that, for languages with disjoint signatures, being definitionally mergeable and intertranslatability are equivalent, see e.g., (Barrett and Halvorson 2016a , Theorems 1 and 2). Now we show that, for languages with disjoint signatures, definitional equivalence also coincides with these concepts, i.e.:
Theorem 6. Let T and T ′ be two theories formulated in languages with disjoint signatures. Then 
Let theories T and T ′ be definitionally equivalent theories with disjoint sig-
Since they are definitionally equivalent, there exists, by Theorem 4 a chain which consists of a single mergeability and a renaming step between T and T ′ . Since T and T ′ are disjoint, and since renaming by Remark 7 is also a disjoint merger, these two steps can by Theorem 2 be reduced to one
and this is what we wanted to prove.
The converse direction follows straightforwardly from the definitions.
Theorem 7. Let T 1 and T 2 be arbitrary theories, then T 1 and T 2 are mergeable iff they are model mergeable, i.e.,
Proof. Let T 1 and T 2 be arbitrary theories.
Let us first assume that T 1 → ← T 2 and prove that M od(T 1 ) → ← M od(T 2 ).
We know from Lemma 1 that there exist sets of explicit definitions ∆ 12 and ∆ 21 such that
We construct map β between M od(T 1 ) and M od(T 2 ) by extending models of T 1 with the explicit definitions in ∆ 12 , which since M od(T 1 ∪ ∆ 12 ) = M od(T 2 ∪ ∆ 21 ) will be a model of T 1 ∪ ∆ 12 , and then by taking the reduct to the language of T 2 . The inverse map β −1 can be constructed in a completely analogous manner. β is a bijection since it has an inverse defined for every model of T 2 . Through this construction, the relations in β(M)
are the ones defined in M according to ∆ 12 and vice versa, the relations in M are the ones defined in β(M) according to ∆ 21 , and clearly the underlying set of M and β(M) are the same. Hence M od(T 1 ) → ← M od(T 2 ).
Let us now assume that M od(T 1 ) → ← M od(T 2 ) and prove that T 1 → ← T 2 . We know by Definition 13 that there is a bijection β between M od(T 1 ) and M od(T 2 ) that is defined along two sets ∆ 12 and ∆ 21 of explicit definitions such that if M ∈ M od(T 1 ), then
• the underlying set of M and β(M) are the same,
Any model of both T 1 ∪ ∆ 12 and T 2 ∪ ∆ 21 can be obtained by listing the relations of M and β(M) together over the common underlying set M . Therefore, M od(T 1 ∪ ∆ 12 ) = M od(T 2 ∪ ∆ 21 ), and thus by Definition 8,
Theorem 8. Let T 1 and T 2 be arbitrary theories. Then T 1 and T 2 are definitionally equivalent iff they are intertranslatable, i.e.,
Proof. Let us first assume that T 1 ∆ ≡ T 2 . Let T ′ be a disjoint renaming of T 2 to a signature which is also disjoint from the signature of T 1 . By Remark 7 and the transitivity of Consequently, T 1 ⇄ T 2 because relation ⇄ is transitive.
To prove the converse, let us assume that T 1 ⇄ T 2 . Let T ′ again be a disjoint renaming of T 2 to a signature which is also disjoint from the signature of T 1 . By Remark 7 and the transitivity of ⇄, we have T 1 ⇄ T ′ ⇄ T 2 . By Theorem 6,
Theorem 9. Let T 1 and T 2 be arbitrary theories, then T 1 and T 2 are intertranslatable iff their models are intertranslatable, i.e.,
Proof. Let T 1 and T 2 be arbitrary theories. If T 1 or T 2 is inconsistent, then they are by Remark 3 both inconsistent, M od(T 1 ) and M od(T 2 ) are empty classes, and the theorem is trivially true. Let's now for the rest of the proof assume that both T 1 and T 2 are consistent theories and hence that both M od(T 1 ) and M od(T 2 ) are not empty.
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